Volume 18
Issue 2 Summer 1988
Summer 1988

Civil Procedure
Lisa Burke
Judith D. Schrandt

Recommended Citation
Lisa Burke & Judith D. Schrandt, Civil Procedure, 18 N.M. L. Rev. 287 (1988).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol18/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

CIVIL PROCEDURE
LISA BURKE* AND JUDITH D. SCHRANDT**

I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey highlights selected opinions decided during the Survey year and
discusses some of the significant changes in the New Mexico Rules of Civil and
Appellate Procedure. A few decisions from the previous Survey year are included
if pertinent to decisions of this year, as last year's Survey Issue did not include
a survey of civil procedure. No major themes or trends are noted this year, thus,
this article is organized according to the issues as they would arise in a single
lawsuit beginning with jurisdiction.
11.SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court decided one case this year involving state
court jurisdiction over causes of action involving Indians. This area of jurisdiction
is of particular concern in New Mexico given the state's large Indian population,
the number of Indian sovereignties, and the extent of Indian land in the state.
In Foundation Reserve Insurance Co. v. Garcia,' the supreme court concluded
that the state district court had jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action
that an insurance company brought against Indian defendants to determine the
insurer's duties under an insurance policy issued to one of the defendants. In
coming to this conclusion, the court utilized the "infringement" test first set out
in Williams v. Lee.2 A court applying the "infringement" test asks whether a
state court action infringes "on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them. "' The answer to this question determines whether
a state court has jurisdiction over a controversy involving an Indian party or acts
occurring on reservation land.
In upholding the district court's jurisdiction in Garcia, the supreme court gave
great deference to the fact that the parties entered into the insurance contract off
of the reservation, even though the accident which gave rise to the controversy
occurred on the reservation. In this regard, the court distinguished Hartley v.
Baca.' Hartley v. Baca involved a personal injury action arising out of an
automobile accident which occurred on an Indian reservation. In both Hartley
and Garcia, the plaintiffs were non-Indians and the defendants were Indians,
*J.D., University of New Mexico, 1985; Law Clerk to Judge James A. Parker, U.S. District Court,
New Mexico.
**J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1984; Associate at Sheehan, Sheehan & Stelzner,
PA., Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1. 105 N.M. 514, 734 P.2d 754 (1987).
2. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
3. Id. at 220.
quashed, 98 N.M. 51, 644 P.2d 1040 (1982).
4. 97 N.M. 441, 640 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1981), cert.
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and in both cases an automobile accident on the reservation was the event which
precipitated the lawsuit. By characterizing the Garcialawsuit as a contract action
rather than a tort action, the supreme court found that the cause of action arose
off the reservation, because the parties entered into the contract of insurance off
the reservation.
Garcia is an important decision, as it represents the supreme court's reluctance
to leave to the tribal courts the resolution of business disputes between nonIndians and Indians when the parties entered the underlying transaction off the
reservation. Before Garcia, normal business transactions conducted off the reservation with Indian parties may have required non-Indian parties to resort to
tribal remedies when disputes arose. Under Garcia, non-Indian parties can transact business without concern for whether an Indian party is involved in the
transaction. 5
The supreme court decided two cases involving the interplay between a statute
of limitation and amendments to pleadings under New Mexico Rule of Civil
Procedure 15. These two cases hold that an amendment curing jurisdictional
defects in a complaint cannot save jurisdiction when it is filed after ajurisdictional
statute of limitations has run, even though the complaint was filed before the
statute had run. The first case, Dinwiddie v. Board of County Commissioners of
Lea County,6 involved a thirty-day statute of limitations for bringing an election
contest. The supreme court held that once the thirty days had expired and the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, an unverified and therefore fatally defective complaint filed within the limitations
period could not be amended to remedy the verification requirement. 7 Thus, the
court in effect held that the verification requirement itself was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit which must be satisfied within the thirty-day statute of limitations.'
CitizensforLos Alamos, Inc. v. IncorporatedCounty ofLos Alamos,9 presented
a similar situation, this time in a zoning context. Again the supreme court
concluded that where a thirty-day statute of limitations is jurisdictional, an
amendment to rectify a faulty complaint filed after the thirty-day statute of
limitations does not relate back to rescue the original complaint. The plaintiff
in Citizensfor Los Alamos had filed its complaint within thirty days of an adverse
decision of the zoning authority, but the complaint did not conform to the statutory
requirements for appealing a decision of the zoning authority.'o
5. The Garcia court recognized that exclusive tribal jurisdiction would exist over an action involving a
proprietary interest in Indian land. Id. at 516, 734 P.2d at 756. Thus, not all controversies surrounding
contracts formed off the reservation are necessarily within the jurisdiction of state district courts.
6. 103 N.M. 442, 708 P.2d 1043 (1985) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1117 (1986).
7. Id. at 445, 708 P.2d at 1046.

8. The statute in question states in pertinent part,
Any action to contest an election shall be commenced by filing a verified complaint of
contest in the district court of the county where either of the parties resides. Such complaint
shall be filed no later than thirty days from issuance of the certificate of nomination or
issuance of the certificate of election to the successful candidate.

N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 1-14-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1985).

9. 104 N.M. 571, 725 P.2d 250 (1986).

10. The statute at issue in this case was N.M. STAT. ANN. §3-21-9(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1985).
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the zoning authority . . . may present to the
district court a petition, duly verified, setting forth that the decision is illegal, in whole
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These two decisions mark an important exception to the relation back doctrine.
In areas where a statute of limitations might be jurisdictional, complaints should
be carefully drafted to insure not only compliance with the statute of limitations
but also compliance with any other special pleading requirements within the
statutory period for bringing the action.
In the domestic relations area, the court of appeals held in State ex rel. Benzing
v. Benzing, " that an alimony award is covered by the New Mexico Revised
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act's (RURESA)' 2 definition of
"duty of support." Thus, the New Mexico district court had jurisdiction to enforce
a New Jersey award of alimony.' The court of appeals had expressly left this
question open in Altman v. Altman."' The court of appeals' decision in Benzing
conforms with the construction that other jurisdictions give to RURESA to include
enforcement of spousal support in the definition of "duty to support.""
Within the survey year, the court of appeals had three opportunities to apply
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)" 6 in order to determine
whether New Mexico courts had jurisdiction over change of custody situations.
The third decision, Meier v. Davignon, 7 is discussed first.
The Meier court upheld the New Mexico trial court's jurisdiction to modify
its own custody award on the basis of Section 40-10-4(A)(2) of the New Mexico
Statutes, which employs the "best interest of the child" standard." In Meier,
the parents of the child had been awarded joint physical custody by a New
Mexico court.' 9 After the mother moved to Oklahoma, the New Mexico court
modified custody with alternating custody for five months.2' Once the child
reached school age, the mother had custody during the school year and the father
had custody during the summer months. 2' Father petitioned the court in New
Mexico to transfer custody to him.22 The court of appeals upheld the district
court's jurisdiction to grant custody to father..2' The court found that the actions
of the mother which served to undermine the father's relationship with the child,
together with the father's continued residency in New Mexico and the child's
or in part, and specifying the grounds of the illegality. The petition shall be presented
to the court within thirty days after the decision is entered in the records of the clerk of
the zoning authority.
The supreme court had previously held that the limitations statute was jurisdictional in Bolin v. City of
Portales, 89 N.M. 192, 548 P.2d 1210 (1976).
I1. 104 N.M. 129, 717 P.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1986).
12. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-6-1 through 40-6-41 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
13. 104 N.M. at 131, 717 P.2d at 107.
14. 101 N.M. 380, 383, 683 P.2d 62, 65 (Ct. App. 1984).
15. 104 N.M. at 131, 717 P.2d at 107.
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40-10-1 through 40-10-24 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
17. 105 N.M. 567, 734 P.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1987).
18. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-4(A)(2) states that New Mexico courts have jurisdiction to decide child
custody matters when it is in the best interest of the child because:
(a) the child and his parents. or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant
conpection with New Mexico; and
(b) there is available in New Mexico substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships.
19. 105 N.M. at 568, 734 P.2d at 808.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 571, 734 P.2d at 811.
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significant connections with New Mexico through the father's joint physical
custody, supported a finding that it was in the best interest of the child that the
district court continue to exercise jurisdiction.24
Significantly, the court of appeals refused to balance the number of contacts
the child had with different states or the amount of evidence available in each
state to determine whether the New Mexico court had continuing jurisdiction
under Section 40-10-4(A)(2) to modify custody. 2' This is a proper analysis, given
the purpose of continuing jurisdiction of the court that made the custody determination which is to discourage forum shopping. Looking for continuing significant contacts in the original state, rather than balancing contacts between the
original state and other states which might have contact with the child, gives a
presumption of continuing jurisdiction in the original state which is in keeping
with the spirit of the UCCJA.
In contrast to Meier, Trask v. Trask26 found that continuing jurisdiction was
lacking under the "best interest of the child" test where mother and children
had moved away from New Mexico and the only connections between the
children and New Mexico were children's visitation with father, father's joint
legal custody, and father's continued residence in New Mexico.27 In both Meier
and Trask, one parent continued to reside in the original state. The cases are
distinguishable, however, because in Trask, the parent in the original state had
visitation rights only, without physical custody.28 Thus, the court found the child's
contacts with the original state to be far less significant than in Meier.29 This
underlines the court's express intent in Trask to examine the child's contacts,
not the parents', in determining jurisdiction.'
Trask also construed the "home state" definition of the UCCJA to mean the
state in which the child resided for six consecutive months immediately preceding
the commencement of the new custody proceedings, not the original divorce
proceedings.' Thus, New Mexico was not the children's "home state" in determining continuing jurisdiction, when the children had been residing with
mother for three years prior to the initiation of the proceedings to modify visitation."
Finally, the court in Trask determined that, as in other areas, parties cannot
consent to jurisdiction under the UCCJA.33 Thus, a consent decree which provides
for continuing jurisdiction in New Mexico district court to modify custody is
not effective if the court does not otherwise have jurisdiction under the provisions
of the UCCJA.
24. Id. at 569-70, 734 P.2d at 809-10.
25. Id. at 570, 734 P.2d at 810.
26. 104 N.M. 780, 727 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1986).
27. Father conceded that evidence concerning the children's needs was not available in New Mexico.
Father's claim that such information is not required in visitation modification proceedings was rejected by
the court of appeals. Id. at.782-83, 727 P.2d at 90-91.
28. Id. at 781, 727 P.2d at 89.
29. Id. at 782, 727 P.2d at 90.
30. Id. at 783, 727 P.2d at 91.
31. Id. at 782, 727 P.2d at 90.
32. New Mexico would have had continuing jurisdiction to modify visitation under N.M. STAT. ANN.
§40-10-4(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1986), independently of the "best interests of the child" test, if New Mexico
had been the home state of the children.
33. 104 N.M. at 783, 727 P.2d at 91.
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The third case, Elder v. Park,' involved the question of when New Mexico
is required to defer to another state's exercise of jurisdiction in a custody setting.
The court of appeals held that New Hampshire was the home state of the child
under New Hampshire law, the UCCJA and the Federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA). Thus, New Hampshire's prior exercise of jurisdiction
36
over the child precluded the New Mexico courts from taking jurisdiction.
The interesting aspect of Elder is the court of appeals' holding that the notice
requirement of the PKPA is not jurisdictional." This interpretation leads to the
conclusion that a custody determination is pending in a jurisdiction even though
process has not been served. The court of appeals specifically left open the
question of exactly what events will preclude another state from exercising
jurisdiction.3" In Elder, however, the court of appeals found that the entry of a
temporary order of custody by a New Hampshire court, without notice, was
sufficient to preclude New Mexico from exercising jurisdiction."
Even though notice is not jurisdictional, the court was careful to note that
lack of notice made the temporary order of the New Hampshire court unenforceable in New Mexico under the PKPA." Underlying the separation of jurisdiction
from full faith and credit determinations is a continuing concern, seen in all
three of the UCCJA cases, that the primary goal of avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflict in making custody awards mandates construction of the
UCCJA and the PKPA such that only one court should be found to have jurisdiction over custody matters at any one time.4'
This policy concern was taken one step further by the New Mexico Supreme
42
Court in State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Avinger. In Avinger,
the supreme court held that the provisions of the UCCJA apply to determine if
a children's court in New Mexico has jurisdiction to modify a Texas custody
decree in a child neglect and dependency proceeding brought under43N.M. Stat.
Ann. Sections 32-1-1 through 32-1-53 of the New Mexico Statutes. The court
found that as Texas had continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJA, the children's
court was without authority to modify the Texas decree even though an emergency
situation was alleged." Also noteworthy is the supreme court's holding that the
34. 104 N.M. 163, 717 P.2d 1132 (Ct. App. 1986).
35. 28 U.S.C. §1738A (1981).
36. 104 N.M. at 167, 717 P.2d at 1136.
37. Those requirements are contained in subsection (e) as follows: "Before a child custody determination
is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose
parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child."
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e) (1981).
38. 104 N.M. at 169, 717 P.2d at 1138.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 169-70, 717 P.2d at 1138-39.
41. If the notice requirements were found to be jurisdictional, a situation would have arisen where New
Hampshire was exercising jurisdiction according to its statutory authority, but simultaneous jurisdiction in
New Mexico was not precluded by the PKPA.
42. 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290 (1986).
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§32-1-1 to -53 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
44. Id. at 260.720 P.2d at 295. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-10-(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) confers jurisdiction
on a children's court if "the child is physically present in New Mexico and ... it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse
or is otherwise neglected;".
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PKPA does not preempt the UCCJA in the area of child neglect and dependency
proceedings, as the PKPA is not applicable to such proceedings. 45
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the last two survey years, the court of appeals has examined the New
Mexico long-arm statute' twice and both times has found that personal jurisdiction did not exist. In Fox v. Fox,47 personal jurisdiction over father was found
to be lacking in a proceeding to increase child support. As the parties never lived
in New Mexico in the marital relationship, mother asserted jurisdiction under
Subsection I of the long-arm statute, which provides for jurisdiction over those
who transact business in the state.4" The court found that the payment of child
support in New Mexico does not constitute minimum contacts with the state
such that the parent can be said to have purposefully availed himself of the
benefits, protections, and privileges of the laws of the state.49 The result in Fox
is not surprising' ° given the United States Supreme Court decision in Kulko v.
Superior Court of California5 where, in a similar case, the court found no
jurisdiction under due process considerations.
In another domestic relations case, Sparks v. Caldwell,52 the New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection
Act53 preempts the New Mexico long-arm statute with regard to the disposition
of retirement benefits after divorce. This decision is of importance in the domestic
relations area, as subsection 1408(c)(4) of the federal Act enumerates the jurisdictional bases for applying the section and in doing so, departs from the New
Mexico long-arm statute having to do with divorce. 54 Under the federal subsection, jurisdiction is present only if the member of the armed forces has (1) his
residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, (2) his domicile in the forum state, or (3) he consents to jurisdiction.
Thus, it is possible to have long-arm jurisdiction over a military spouse for
divorce purposes but not have jurisdiction over that person for purposes of treating
his or her retirement benefits in a community property settlement.
The most important personal jurisdiction case decided this year by the court
of appeals is Visaragga v. Gates Rubber Co." In Visaragga, Gates Rubber
manufactured a hose and sold it to Littlejohn, who in turn sold the hose to
45. 104 N.M. at 257, 720 P.2d at 292.
46. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16 (Repi. Pamp. 1987).
47. 103 N.M. 155, 703 P.2d 932 (Ct. App. 1985).
48. Id. at 156, 703 P.2d at 933.
49. Id. at 156-57, 703 P.2d at 933-34.
50. Id.
51. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
52. 104 N.M. 475, 723 P.2d 244 (1986).
53. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16(A)(5) (Repl. Pamp. 1987) confers jurisdiction in an action for divorce,
separate maintenance or annulment, if such cause of action arises from "the circumstance of living in the
marital relationship within the state, notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state, as to all obligations
arising from alimony, child support or real or personal property settlements . . . if one party to the marital
relationship continues to reside in the state."
55. 104 N.M. 143, 717 P.2d 596 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 137, 717 P.2d 590 (1986).
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Timpte.56 Timpte incorporated the hose onto a tank truck and sold the truck to
a New Mexico corporation. 57 While the truck was making a delivery of gasoline
in New Mexico, an explosion occurred injuring the plaintiff.58 All transactions
59
preceding the sale of the tank truck by Timpte took place in Colorado.
Littlejohn, a defendant in the lawsuit in New Mexico, moved to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.' It was established that Littlejohn's only connec6
tions with New Mexico were unsolicited sales to three customers in New Mexico. "
As the cause of action was unrelated to these sales, the court of appeals found
that these connections were insufficient to bring Littlejohn within the "transaction
of any business" provision of the long-arm statute.62
In analyzing subsection 3 of the long-arm statute,63 which predicates jurisdiction on the commission of a tortious act within the state, the court of appeals
held that more than foreseeability that the hose might find its way to New Mexico
is necessary to satisfy minimum contacts in a stream of commerce case.64 That
something more is found by looking at the quality and nature of defendant's acts
to determine if defendant has purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum state.65 In the case of a secondary distributor
with a narrow market for its products in the forum state, which has never pursued
whose contacts are
a policy of purposeful business activity in the state, and 66
minimal and random in nature, no minimum contacts exist.
A year after Visarraga, the United States Supreme Court decided a similar
stream of commerce case, Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
Calif., Solano County.67 In Asahi, the Supreme Court was faced with the question
of whether the awareness of a foreign manufacturer that its component part
would reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constituted minimum
contacts under InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington68 and its progeny.
In a crazy quilt of concurrences, four justices found that minimum contacts
were lacking under the same analysis used by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in Visarraga. In order to find minimum contacts, both the Asahi and Visarraga
courts require an action on the part of the defendant which is purposefully directed
toward the forum state.69 Such action must be something more than merely
placing a product in the stream of commerce.7" The other four justices in Asahi,
who were willing to reach the minimum contacts analysis, agreed that "pur56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Pamp.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 145, 717 P.2d at 588.
Id.
Id. at 144, 717 P.2d at 587.
Id. at 145. 717 P.2d at 588.
Id. at 145-46, 717 P.2d at 588-89.
Id. at 147, 717 P.2d at 590.
Id. The "transaction of business" provision is found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16(A)(I) (Repl.
1987).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-1-16(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
104 N.M. at 148, 717 P.2d at 591.
Id.
Id. at 149, 717 P.2d at 592.
107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
107 S. Ct. at 1031; 104 N.M. at 148, 717 P.2d at 591.
107 S. Ct. at 1031.
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poseful availment" is the test, but disagreed with the result reached by the first
four justices. 7' In the second four justices' view, the awareness of a participant
in the "regular and anticipated flow of products" that its product is being marketed
in the forum state is sufficient.72 In either event, the Visarraga analysis is consistent with either approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. The final
result in Visarragais also in accordance with either result in Asahi, as Littlejohn's
anticipated flow of products into New Mexico was minimal. 73
IV. NOTICE
One of the changes in the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure this Survey
year occurred in the area of service of process. Under the new Rule 1-004, which
became effective for cases filed on or after January 1, 1987, service now can
be made by first class mail on certain classes of persons. 74 The new rule conforms
with existing federal practice.75
In Macaron v. Associates Capital Services Corp.,76 the court of appeals declared that the New Mexico Tax Code sale provisions do not provide for constitutionally adequate notice in certain circumstances. The notice requirement of
the Tax Code sale provisions allows for notice by certified mail to the legal
owner and published notice to the rest of the world before real property can be
71. Id. at 1035.
72. Id.
73. An eight member majority of the United States Supreme Court in Asahi agreed that under traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice it would have been unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over this
particular defendant under the circumstances. The factors that the court looked at in making this determination were the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state and the plaintiff's interests in
obtaining relief.
Although the case had started out as a products liability case, the only piece of the lawsuit not settled
was an indemnity claim on the part of a Taiwanese corporation against petitioner, a Japanese corporation,
based on a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan. With these facts, the Court
concluded that California did not have a sufficient interest in the litigation to balance out the burden on
petitioner, as an alien defendant, in litigating the issue in California.
Although this discussion of the Asahi decision is by no means exhaustive, it is interesting to note that
the Supreme Court has made it clear in the Asahi decision that the due process analysis is definitely a two
pronged process with separate considerations under each prong. Although the Supreme Court has been
utilizing this two step approach consistently, see, e.g.. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985), this is the first time that, at least for some of the justices, the outcome of the two prongs is divergent.
Thus, even with minimum contacts, it is possible to find no personal jurisdiction.
74. The new section E reads:
A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class referred to in
Subparagraph (I) or (2) of Paragraph F of this rule by mailing a copy of the summons
and of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served,
together with two (2) copies of a notice and acknowledgement conforming with the form
set out below and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. If no
acknowledgment of service under this subdivision of this rule is received by the sender
within twenty (20) days after the date of mailing, service of such summons and complaint
shall be made by a person authorized by Paragraph D of this rule, in the manner prescribed
by Subparagraph (I) or (2) of Paragraph F of this rule. Unless good cause is shown for
not doing so, the court shall order the payment of the costs of personal service by the
person served if such person does not complete and return within twenty (20) days after
mailing the notice and acknowledgement of receipt of the summons.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C) and (D).
76. 105 N.M. 380, 733 P.2d I I (Ct. App. 1987).
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sold for delinquent taxes. 77 In Macaron a mortgagee failed to receive actual
7
notice before a tax sale of the mortgaged property. " The court held that the
situation was indistinguishable from the recent United States Supreme Court case

79
of Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams. The Mennonite Court, in holding

that a mortgagee under Indiana law had a legally protected property interest,
before 8a
found that a mortgagee was entitled to more than constructive notice
is publicly recorded. 0
that
mortgage
a
in
identified
is
mortgagee
the
if
sale
tax
Adequate notice to such a mortgagee is constructive 8notice supplemented by
notice mailed to the mortgagee or by personal service. '
A person constitutionally entitled to more than constructive notice under Mennonite is any party whose "name and address are reasonably ascertainable using
82
mortgagees
reasonably diligent efforts." In both Mennonite and Macaron the
83
had recorded interests which were easily accessible to the state. Thus, both
were entitled to notice under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the United States Constitution before the tax sale.
A party with an unrecorded purchase agreement to buy real property was not
so lucky in Cano v. Lovato. In Cano, which was decided before Macaron, the
court of appeals refused to require the state to go beyond the county clerk's
record to ascertain parties who might have an interest in property, unless the
state has actual knowledge of such parties."8 Thus, in New Mexico, the Mennonite
requirement to use reasonable diligence to ascertain parties with an interest in
property before a tax sale is limited to checking for parties with recorded interests.
V. PLEADINGS
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted two new pleading rules which will
affect cases filed after January 1, 1987. New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure
1-010(B) was amended to add a restriction that, except in cases based on contract
or based on written instruments or agreements, complaints will not be accepted
by the district court clerk if they allege damages in any specific monetary amount.
If district court clerks follow this new rule, the new pleading restriction will be
enforced at the moment of filing. This could be hazardous if a party attempts to
file a complaint which does not comply with the new rule on the last possible
day under a statute of limitations and the clerk's office fails to accept it.
New Mexico Civil Procedure Rule 1-011 was also amended and will be
effective after January 1, 1987. The amendment to Rule I I extends the good
faith signature requirement for attorneys signing pleadings to attorney signatures
77. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§7-38-66(A) and 7-38-67(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
78. 105 N.M. at 381, 733 P.2d at 12.
79. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
80. Id. at 798.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 800.
83. Id. at 798; 105 N.M. 382, 733 P.2d at 13.
84. 105 N.M. 522, 734 P.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 246, 719 P.2d 1267 (1986)
cert. quashed 105 N.M. 438, 733 P.2d 1321 (1987).
85. Id. at 533, 734 P.2d at 773.
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on all other papers submitted or filed on behalf of a client. 6 The new rule also
extends the granting of sanctions to parties for willful violations.
Res judicata as an affirmative defense may now be raised on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under New Mexico Civil Procedure Rule I012(b)(6) if the facts supporting the defense appear plainly upon the face of the
complaint. This holding by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Universal Life
Church v. Coxon"7 follows federal motion practice and overrules Three Rivers
Land Company v. Maddoux 8 in this regard.
Plaintiffs, in filing complaints, should be careful to anticipate possible affirmative defenses which might appear from the face of the complaint. To insure that
a complaint will not be dismissed prematurely, plaintiffs need to not only anticipate affirmative defenses but include any factual allegations which might serve
to guard against them. This is the teaching of Romero v. U.S. Life Insurance
Co. 9 In Romero, the court of appeals held that as it was clear from the face of
the complaint that the action was time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations, the trial court should have dismissed the complaint.' Factual allegations in the complaint of tolling or estoppel were necessary to save the complaint from dismissal. 9'
In Tipton v. Texaco, the supreme court continued the development of New
Mexico law on the subject of the abolition of joint and several liability under
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,92 by extending the scope of New
Mexico Civil Procedure Rule 1-014(A) to allow defendants the use of the thirdparty complaint as a means of joining other alleged tortfeasors. 9 Rule 1-014(A)
provides that a defendant may bring in a non-party "who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." The supreme court
recognized that the rule contemplates joinder under Rule 1-014(A) only if secondary liability to the defendant is alleged,' which is not the case between many
joint tortfeasors after the abolition of joint and several liability. In Tipton, however, the court found that a more liberal construction of Rule 1-014(A) was
necessary in the joint tortfeasor context to assure that the practice engaged in
before Bartlett of bringing in joint tortfeasors as third parties could continue
under Rule 1-014." 5 By interpreting Rule 1-014 more broadly than its language
86. Under N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-011,
"an attorney certifies by his signature that he has read the pleading
or other paper, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is a good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
87. 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2482 (1987).
88. 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240 (1982), overruled, 105 N.M. 57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986).
89. 104 N.M. 241, 719 P.2d 819 (Ct. App. 1986).
90. id. at 242-43, 719 P.2d at 820-21.
91. Id. at 243, 719 P.2d at 821. Romero also held that the lower court was mistaken in taking judicial
notice of a previous case on file with the same court in ruling on the motion to dismiss. In making this
determination, the court of appeals was merely reiterating the long established rule that if any matters
outside the pleadings aretaken into consideration by the court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, the motion needs to be treated as a summary judgment motion.
92. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).
93. Tipton v.Texaco, 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
94. Id. at691-92, 712 P.2d at 1353-54.
95. Id. at693, 712 P.2d at1355.
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would suggest, the court in essence has amended Rule 1-014 to procedurally
96
accommodate the abolition of joint and several liability.
This approach presents a problem for tort cases involving joint tortfeasors
tried in diversity by federal courts. Federal courts are not going to be as willing
to give the same liberal gloss to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 14(a) as the New
Mexico courts give to the identical New Mexico Rule 1-014(A). In Hefley v.
Textron, Inc.," the Tenth Circuit specifically held that federal courts are not
bound to follow state third party practice procedure even though federal courts
are bound by a state's substantive rules on the abolition of joint and several
liability.9" Furthermore, Hefley, in construing Federal Rule 14(a), disallowed the
joinder of potential concurrent tortfeasors as third parties under a state law that
had abolished joint and several liability." Thus, although defendant's problem
of joining concurrent tortfeasors is solved by the use of Rule 14(A) in state court,
no method has been judicially endorsed for federal courts sitting in diversity in
New Mexico.
The court of appeals had its first opportunity to apply the rule of Tipton in
Wilson v. Gillis."ro In doing so, the court of appeals limited Tipton by refusing
to allow defendant to join a concurrent tortfeasor who had already settled with
plaintiff.'0' Under the court of appeals' interpretation, Tipton only applies to
third parties who are potentially liable to plaintiff." 2 As a settling tortfeasor
would not be subject to further liability if joined, Rule 1-014(A) cannot be used
to join that party.'o 3 The court noted that to allow defendants to bring in settling
tortfeasors as parties would discourage settlement, when settlement is to be
encouraged in such situations. On another collateral pleading matter, the court
of appeals further held that a defendant need not join third parties to raise the
Bartlett defense as an affirmative defense in an answer."
In Passino v. Cascade Steel Fabricators,Inc., 5 the supreme court let stand
a court of appeals' determination that a defaulting tortfeasor is not entitled to
introduce evidence of comparative fault of other defendants at a hearing to
96. The supreme court in a later case agreed that Rule I- 014(A) was "adjusted" by Tipton to "prevent
sweeping changes in third-party practice by keeping within the rule a category of cases we have long
considered appropriate for consolidated adjudication." Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 105 N.M.
586, 587, 734 P.2d 1269, 1270 (1987). For a full discussion of the procedural ramification of Tipton, see
Occhialino, Procedural Ramifications of the Bartlett Decision: Tipton Tiptoes Toward a Solution, IX The
New Mexico Trial Lawyer 37 (April 1986).
97. 713 F.2d 1487 (10th Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 1496-97.
99. Id. at 1498. Hefley involved Kansas law.
100. 105 N.M. 259, 731 P.2d 955 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied. 105 N.M. 230, 731 P.2d 373 (1987).
101. Id. at 262-63, 731 P.2d at958-59.
102. id. at 262, 731 P.2d at 958.
103. Id.at 263, 731 P.2d at 959.
104. Id. at 262. It should be noted that the legislature passed a Bill during the Survey year, which will
take effect for cases initially filed on and after July I. 1987, specifically purporting to answer legislatively
many of the substantive questions and problems which have arisen with the abolition of joint and several
liability. Although the Bill will have definite procedural ramifications in tort litigation, it is beyond the
scope of this Survey to discuss the substantive provisions of the Bill and their possible procedural ramifications.
105. 105 N.M. 457, 734 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1986).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

determine damages in a case where the other defendants have settled with plaintiff."6 The court reasoned that by defaulting, a defendant has conceded his
liability and has waived an apportionment of damages. 7 To find otherwise would
allow a defaulting party to litigate his culpability, which should be foreclosed
to him under the default rules." The court of appeals found this to be a harsh
but inevitable result. "
The court of appeals' concern for the result to the defaulting tortfeasor and
the history of this case are examples of the courts' struggle to find an equitable
framework for comparative negligence and the abolition of joint and several
liability. Judge Bivins, in his concurrence in Passino, suggests that once damages
are determined, the amount paid in settlement by the other parties should be
deducted from plaintiff's award from the defaulting party. "0 This solution, however, which insures that plaintiff not receive a double recovery, does not give
plaintiff the benefit of the bargain in a good settlement. Rather, that benefit is
passed on to a defaulting tortfeasor. On the positive side for plaintiff, if plaintiff
makes a bad settlement decision, the defaulting defendant will be liable such
that plaintiff is made whole, even if the amount paid by the defaulting party
represents more than that tortfeasor's comparative fault.
In contrast, Wilson v. Gait' provides that a plaintiff's award against a defendant is not to be reduced by any amount that plaintiff has already received
in settlement with other defendants. Thus, in the non-defaulting situation, plaintiff
is entitled to the benefit of his bargain. '2
As becomes obvious in any discussion of the developing law of the abolition
of joint and several liability under Bartlett, many procedural and substantive
questions remain for the legislature and the courts to tackle. At times it appears
that with each new development, new questions arise as fast as solutions are
found to the problems at hand.
VI. DISCOVERY
Once again, the recent appellate cases concerning discovery dealt primarily
with the propriety of imposing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery
orders. New Mexico has long adhered to the rule that before the court may
impose a discovery sanction which would entail a denial of an opportunity to
be heard on the merits, noncompliance must be
shown to be willful, in bad faith
3
or due to the fault of the disobedient party. "
106. Id. at 458-59, 734 P.2d at 236-37.
107. Id.
108. id. at 459, 734 P.2d at 237.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983).
112. Section I(E) of Senate Bill 164 may foreclose Judge Bivins' suggested approach although that is
not clear. Section I(E) provides:
"No defendant who is severally liable shall be entitled to contribution from any other
person, nor shall such defendant be entitled to reduce the dollar damages determined
by the factfinder to be owed by the defendant to the plaintiff in accordance with
Subsection B of this section by any amount that the plaintiff has recovered from any
other person whose fault may have also proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.
N.M. Sen. Bill 164 (1987).
113. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 202, 629 P.2d 231, 278 (1980). A
willful violation is defined in United Nuclear as: "Any conscious or intentional failure to comply . . . . as
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In Sandoval v. United NuclearCorp., 4 the fact that plaintiff was an excludable
alien constituted an excuse for non-compliance with a court order that he appear
in New Mexico for a deposition. As plaintiff's failure to appear was not willful,
due to his status, the trial court erred in terminating plaintiff's worker's compensation benefits as a sanction under New Mexico Civil Procedure Rule
1-037."' The court also found that evidence of plaintiff's physical condition
which might have made it impossible for him to travel to New Mexico was
relevant to plaintiff's willful non-compliance." 6 The fact that plaintiff was a
fugitive and was subject to arrest if he returned to the United States, however,
did not render the deposition order burdensome." 7
A similar situation of non-compliance was presented in Bishop v. Lloyd McKee
Motors, Inc.'" In that case, the court of appeals intimated that if a plaintiff was
prevented from complying with a discovery order due to his military service,
dismissal as a sanction would be inappropriate. "'9
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted certain amendments to the New
Mexico discovery rules, effective for cases pending after October 15, 1986.'20
The most significant change occurred with the amendment to Rule 1-026(B)(3)
which makes insurance contracts discoverable in the event that the insurance
company may be liable to satisfy any part or all of a judgment or liable to
indemnify or reimburse payments made to satisfy a judgment. Once again, this
2
amendment mirrors the existing Federal Civil Procedure Rules. ' ,

The amendments to Rules 1-030 and 1-032 concern the methods for taking
depositions and the use of depositions at trial. Of significance is the permissible
use of a deposition of a witness who is within 100 miles from the trial or hearing,
such use and the notice
if an order is entered prior to the deposition permitting
22
of the deposition states the intended use at trial.
VII. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
In the three cases concerning amendment of pleadings decided during the
Survey year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals remained faithful to the wellestablished policy of liberally permitting amendment of pleadings, while balancing that policy against unfair surprise or prejudice to the opposing party. In
Beyale v. Arizona PublicService Co.,

23

the court of appeals held that amendment

distinguished from accidental or involuntary non-compliance, and . . . no wrongful intent need be shown
to make such a failure willful."
114. 105 N.M. 105, 729 P.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1986).
115. Id. at 109, 729 P.2d at 507. The action in Sandoval was filed by defendant to terminate benefits
on the basis that plaintiff's disability had terminated.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 105 N.M. 399, 733 P.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1987).
119. Id. at 401, 733 P.2d at 370. The dismissal ofthe case in Bishop was reversed and remanded because
the trial court did not specifically make a finding of willful noncompliance. Such a finding is necessary in
order to impose a sanction of dismissal.
120. New Mexico Civil Procedure Rules 1-026, 1-030, 1-032, and 1-037 were amended.
121. Amended Rule 1-026 also incorporates the federal limitations placed on discovery due to expense,
inconvenience, duplication, etc., and follows the Federal Rules in making provisions for discovery conferences.
122. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-032(A)(3)(c). The new rules also require notice of intended use at trial to appear
in the notice of deposition if the deposition is to be used at trial pursuant to Rule 1-032(A)(3)(f). Subsection
(f) allows the use of a deposition at trial upon "exceptional circumstances."
123. 105 N.M. 112, 729 P.2d 1366 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. I1, 729 P.2d 1365 (1986).
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should not be allowed if the effect of such amendment would be undue surprise
or prejudice to the opposing party. 24 In this worker's compensationcase, defendant announced during its opening statement that it would rely on failure to
give notice as an affirmative defense.' 25 That affirmative defense had not been
pleaded in defendant's answer to plaintiff's complaint.' 26 At the end of the first
day of trial, defendant formally moved to amend the pleadings to raise the issue
of notice on the ground that evidence had been introduced on that issue.' 27 The
trial court upheld plaintiff's objection, and orally ruled that defendant had waived
the affirmative defense of failure to give notice.' 28 After judgment was entered
in favor of plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that it should
have been permitted to litigate the issue of notice;' 29 the trial court denied the
motion.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit amendment
of defendant's answer on the first day of trial. 30
' The court noted that the purpose
of pleadings, to give the opposing party notice of the claims being made, "would
hardly be accomplished by a ruling that the issue of notice need not be 'placed
in issue' until opening statements.' 3' Defendant had not disputed that plaintiff
would have been prejudiced if the issue had been litigated at trial, but argued
that any prejudice would have been cured by a continuance. 32 The court of
appeals rejected defendant's argument because the case had been pending for
three years at the time of trial, and the grant or denial of a continuance was
within the trial court's discretion. 133 The court's ruling was based, however, on
the fact that plaintiff had not impliedly consented to trial on the notice issue."
In Berry v. Meadows, '31 on the other hand, plaintiff failed to object at trial to
the introduction of evidence relating to affirmative defenses not pled in defendant's answer. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's award to defendant
based on those affirmative defenses.' 36 Similarly, in Bagwell v. Shady Grove
Truck Stop, '31 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's amendment of plaintiff's complaint when trial of the complaint as amended had occurred.' 38 The
trial court's failure to enter an order explicitly granting plaintiff's motion to
amend the complaint did not alter that result. 1'
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
During this Survey year, the United States Supreme Court decided two important cases dealing with the appropriate standard for summary judgment under
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.,at 115, 729 P.2d at 1369.
Id.at 113, 729 P.2d at 1367.
Id.at 113-14, 729 P.2d at 1367-68.
Id.at 114, 729 P.2d at 1368.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116, 729 P.2d at 1370.
Id. at 115, 729 P.2d at 1369.
id.
Id. at 116, 729 P.2d at 1370.
Id.
103 N.M. 761, 713 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 768, 713 P.2d at 1024.
104 N.M. 14, 715 P.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 16, 715 P.2d at 464.
Id.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The standard for summary judgment
articulated in these cases differs significantly from the standard traditionally
applied under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the New
Mexico courts' analyses of the New Mexico rules traditionally followed the
federal courts' analyses of the federal rules, the new United States Supreme
Court cases squarely present the New Mexico courts with the question of whether
to continue this practice. If the cases coming from the New Mexico courts since
the decisions from the United States Supreme Court are any indication, New
Mexico will continue to adhere to a stricter standard for summary judgment
under the New Mexico rules.
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the United States Supreme Court held that the
movant for summary judgment need only "inform the district court of the basis
for its motion," and identify the portions of the record demonstrating "the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact."'' The burden then shifts to the nonmovant
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.' 42 The Court
reasoned that if, after adequate time for discovery, the party who would have
the burden of proof at trial failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an essential element of his case, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c) required the entry of summary judgment against the nonmovant.'43
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the United States Supreme Court elaborated
on the standard's requirement of a "genuine" issue of material fact. The Court
held that when plaintiff was required to prove his case by clear and convincing
evidence at trial, the same standard applied in determining whether plaintiff had
demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat
defendant's motion for summary judgment.'" A lesser burden of proof would
have undermined the traditional analysis of summary judgment under the standard
to be applied to motions for directed verdict.' 45 In both Celotex and Liberty
Lobby, then, the United States Supreme Court indicated its support for the
granting of summary judgment motions under Federal Rule 56.
During the Survey year, the New Mexico appellate courts decided three cases
dealing with the standard for summary judgment after Celotex and Liberty Lobby
were decided. " In none of the New Mexico cases were the Celotex or Liberty
140. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
141. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Celotex involved a wrongful death action brought on behalf of a worker
exposed to defendant's asbestos products. The court of appeals had held that defendant's failure to support
its summary judgment motion with evidence negating exposure precluded a grant of summary judgment
in its favor. The plaintiff, however, had failed to answer interrogatories identifying witnesses who could
testify about the decedent's exposure to defendant's asbestos products.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 322.
144. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255. This case involved a libel suit brought by a "citizens' lobby" and
its founder against columnist Jack Anderson, his publisher and the publishing company's president as a
result of allegedly defamatory articles depicting plaintiffs as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist and fascist. The
United States Supreme Court had previously established that in a libel suit brought by a public figure, the
plaintiff was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant has acted with actual malice.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). That standard was, therefore, applicable in Liberty
Lobby as well.
145. 477 U.S. at 250-51.
146. Koenig v. Perez, 104 N.M. 664, 726 P.2d 341 (1986); Martinez v. Logsdon, 104 N.M. 479, 723
P.2d 248 (1986); Burgi v. Acid Engineering, Inc., 104 N.M. 557, 724 P.2d 765 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
104 N.M. 460, 722 P.2d 1182 (1986).
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Lobby standards applied or discussed. In Koenig v. Perez, the New Mexico
Supreme Court stated that the movant for summary judgment must make a "prima
facie showing" of entitlement to summary judgment. 47 After that showing is
made, the burden shifts to the nonmovant "to show at least a reasonable doubt
as to whether a genuine issue for trial exists.""' The court did not elaborate on
the "reasonable doubt" standard and its practical application in rules of civil,
as opposed to criminal, procedure.
In Martinez v. Logsdon, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that after the
movant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment,
the nonmovant "must submit more than a bare assertion that an issue of fact
exists" to defeat the motion.' 49 Again, the court did not discuss the precise burden
on the nonmovant.
Finally, in Burgi v. Acid Engineering, Inc., the New Mexico Court of Appeals
relied on established New Mexico summary judgment jurisprudence'" and stated
that a genuine issue of material fact exists when equally logical but conflicting
inferences can be drawn from basic, material facts that are not in dispute.' 5'
These three cases show no deviation from the strict standard for summary judgment traditionally applied under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, and
no accommodation of the newly-articulated standards under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.

IX. JURY TRIAL
A. Right to Jury Trial
In two cases decided during the Survey year, the New Mexico Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals articulated more clearly the approach to be used in determining when the right to jury trial attaches in civil cases, and how to try cases
presenting legal and equitable issues. In State ex rel. McAdams v. DistrictCourt
of the Eighth JudicialDistrict, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that
the question of guarantor liability was a legal issue independent of a foreclosure
suit, and that defendants were, therefore, entitled to a jury trial on that issue. 52
'
The court also reaffirmed the rule that when legal and equitable issues are joined
in a lawsuit, the trial court first should decide the equitable issues, and allow
any remaining independent legal issues to be tried to the jury. 153
In Scott v. Woods, 54 the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted the rule set
out by the United States Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard55 for determining
147. 104 N.M. at 666, 726 P.2d at 343.
148. Id.
149. 104 N.M. at 482, 723 P.2d at 251.
150. The court cited the standard set out in Akre v. Washburn, 92 N.M. 487, 590 P.2d 635 (1979). 104
N.M. at 559, 724 P.2d at 767.
151. 104 N.M. at 559, 724 P.2d at 767.
152. 105 N.M. 95, 728 P.2d 1364 (1986). The court followed Evans Financial Corp. v. Strasser, 99
N.M. 788, 664 P.2d 986 (1983) and reconciled the earlier case of Young v. Vail, 29 N.M. 324, 222 P.
912 (1924). Young v. Vail was still good law insofar as it held that there is no right to jury trial of legal
issues necessarily decided in the foreclosure suit. 105 N.M. at 96, 728 P.2d at 1365.
153. 105 N.M. at 97, 728 P.2d at 1366.
154. 105 N.M. 177, 730 P.2d 480 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 26, 727 P.2d 1341 (1986).
155. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
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when a party is entitled to a jury in a shareholder's derivative suit. In Ross v.
Bernhard, the Court devised a test for identifying issues for jury determination
by considering the nature of the underlying claim, its historical origins, and the
practical limitations of the jury. " Applying that test, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals determined that when a "shareholder's derivative suit raised legal claims
or issues to which the corporation would be entitled to a jury trial, those claims
or issues should be tried to a jury when demanded."' 7 The trial court would be
required to make findings of fact and enter conclusions of law as to the issues
not requiring a jury, even when an advisory jury was used.' 8 The court emphasized, however, that the right to jury trial was not to be determined by the
terminology used in the complaint; rather, the burden was on the party asserting
the right to a jury trial to establish that right. 9 The court also stated that the
nature of relief sought was not determinative; the court must examine the nature
of the claims to determine whether they were equitable or legal in substance."
After reviewing the nature of plaintiffs' claims, the court of appeals determined
that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any issue or claim that was triable to
the jury, reversed the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs and remanded to the
district court for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.' 6 '
B. Trial Procedure
In two cases decided during the Survey year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
gave broad latitude to the procedural decisions of the trial judge in conducting
trials,' 62 and, in two other cases, restricted the allility of successor judges to
complete trials begun by their predecessors.' In Gallegos v. Yeargin Western
Constructors, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to allow modification of the pretrial order to enable the defendants to call witnesses not
identified in that order.1"4 Defendants had identified additional witnesses three
weeks before trial and one week after the deadline specified in the pretrial order
for identifying witnesses. 65 The substance of these witnesses' testimony was
identified less than two weeks before trial, after the deadline for completing
discovery had passed."s6 The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's refusal to allow modification of the pretrial order to allow
defendants to call the additional witnesses.' 67
156. The three-prong test, as explained in Scott v. Woods, considered (I) premerger custom, (2) the
remedy sought, and (3) the abilities and limitations of juries. 105 N.M. at 182, 730 P.2d at 485.
157. Id. at 183, 730 P.2d at 486.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 188. 730 P.2d at 491.
162. Gallegos v. Yeargin Western Constructors, 104 N.M. 623, 725 P.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1986); Sanchez
v. National Elec. Supply, 105 N.M. 97, 728 P.2d 1366 (Ct. App. 1986).
163. Pritchard v. Halliburton Serv., 104 N.M. 102, 717 P.2d 78 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103 N.M.
798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986); Grudzina v. New Mexico Youth Diagnostic & Dev. Center, 104 N.M. 576, 725
P.2d 255 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 460, 722 P.2d 1182 (1986).
164. 104 N.M. at 625, 725 P.2d at 601.,
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The court emphasized the fact that defendants had not disclosed the substance of the witnesses'
testimony or made the witnesses available for depositions without notice when they became aware of the
need for the additional witnesses. Id. Had defendants done so, the result might have been different.
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In the same case, the court of appeals also upheld the trial court's refusal to
grant a continuance when a defense witness failed to appear at trial.' 6 The
witness had not been subpoenaed. 69 The appellate court pointed out that a party
has an obligation to subpoena a witness if he wants to assure his presence. 7 '
Since defendants had neither subpoenaed their witness, nor proffered his testimony by deposition, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to grant
a continuance.' 7
On a different trial procedure issue, the court of appeals in Pritchard v.
HalliburtonServices held that a successor judge may not sign and file findings
of fact and conclusions of law prepared by the predecessor judge who heard the
case but left the bench before signing and entering a decision. 72
' The predecessor
judge had prepared the findings and conclusions but had not signed them when
she left office; her successor signed them and entered judgment. The court
74
considered New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 1-052(B)(l)'7 and 1-063,1
and reasoned that in this case Rule 1-063 could not provide an exception to Rule
1-052's mandate that the trial court provide a written decision consisting of
findings of fact and conclusions of law stated separately. ,' Such written findings
may ordinarily only be entered by the judge who "conducted the trial and heard
the evidence."' 7 6 Rule 1-063 would have applied to allow another judge to
conduct proceedings only after findings of fact and conclusions of law were
filed. The appellate court refused to allow a successor judge to render a decision
without having heard the evidence or observed the witnesses,' and determined
that the proper remedy was a new trial. '7
In Grudzina v. New Mexico Youth Diagnostic & Development Center, a case
decided shortly after Pritchard,the court of appeals held that although a successor
judge did not have authority to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
168. Id. at 626, 725 P.2d at 602.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. td. See also, Sanchez v. National Elec. Supply. 105 N.M. at 99, 728 P.2d at 1368 (plaintiff must
show actual prejudice to overturn trial court's denial of a request for continuance).
172. 104 N.M. at 103, 717 P.2d at 79.
173. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-052(B)(l)(a) provides in part:
Upon the trial of any case by the court without a jury, its decision, which shall consist
of its findings of fact and conclusions of law, must be given in writing and filed with
the clerk in the cause. In such decision the court shall find the facts and give its
conclusions of law pertinent to the case, which must be stated separately.
174. N.M. R. Cv. P. 1-063 provides:
If by reason of death, sickness or other disability, ajudge before whom an action has
been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court under these
rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed,
then any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action
was tried may perform those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot
perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason,
he may in his discretion grant a new trial.
175. 104 N.M. at 104, 717 P.2d at 80.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 105, 717 P.2d at 81. The court also found that the fact that the predecessor judge had prepared
the decision did not affect the result; an unsigned decision, like oral statements, did not constitute a decision
by the trial court. Id. Rather. the term "decision," as used in Rule 1-052(B)(1), meant findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Id.
178. Id. at 106, 717 P.2d at 82.
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prepared by a predecessor judge, such error was not jurisdictional or fundamental
and therefore did not necessitate a new trial. "' In that case, neither party objected
when the successor judge signed the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and the issue was not raised on appeal.'"' The court clarified its earlier holding
in Pritchard,explaining that although the successor judge's signing findings of
fact and conclusions of law prepared by his predecessor was error, such action
was unauthorized, rather than void for lack of jurisdiction.' 8 The court stated
that the parties could agree to have the successor judge enter the findings of fact
and conclusions of law, or otherwise complete the case, but specifically did not
decide whether the simple failure to object, without a stipulation, was sufficient
to waive the right to have the judge who heard the evidence decide the case.'2
This issue remains an open question.
X. POST TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Post Trial Motions
The New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a new rule concerning post trial
motions, which will significantly affect cases filed after January 1, 1987. New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 12-201(E)(5) provides that a motion for new
trial, or a post trial motion attacking the judgment, verdict or findings of fact,
is automatically deemed denied if not granted within thirty days from the date
filed. Furthermore, the new rule provides that the time for filing an appeal is
not extended by filing a motion for new trial.
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of a new trial because of the improper
83
conduct of the court bailiff towards the jury in Prudencio v. Gonzales.' The
death
this
wrongful
in
the
defendants
one
of
of
brother-in-law
was
the
bailiff
action.' During the trial, the bailiff had introduced the jury to his wife, who
was the sister of one of the defendants, and the sister-in-law of another de' The bailiff had also introduced the jury to his young daughter and
fendant. 85
son, the niece and nephew of two defendants, and had allowed his son to eat
' At the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for new trial, the court heard
with the jury. 86
testimony that the bailiff had urged the jury not to select one of the panel members
as foreman, and that the bailiff had hinted that he was somehow involved in the
trial."'87 Although the plaintiffs stipulated that the jurors, if called as witnesses,
would testify that they had not been influenced by the bailiff's conduct, the trial
court found that the "subjective and subtle nature of these incidents created the
presumption that the jury had been improperly influenced," and ordered a new
trial. "'
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

104 N.M. at 581, 725 P.2d at 260.
Id. at 580, 725 P.2d at 259.
Id. at 581, 725 P.2d at 260.
Id.
104 N.M. 788, 727 P.2d 553 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 761, 726 P.2d 1391 (1986).
104 N.M. at 789, 727 P.2d at 554.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court of appeals affirmed the grant of a new trial.' 89 The court ruled that
the trial court's order of a new trial was not an abuse of discretion; because "a
bailiff, by his position, represents the authority of the court, and where there is
evidence of impartiality of the jury's deliberations, the trial court, in the exercise
of its discretion, may properly order a new trial. "'" The court of appeals agreed
that the record supported a finding of improper influence by the bailiff, from
which a presumption of prejudice might arise, because "jurors will seldom admit
their inability to act impartially," and that defendants failed to rebut the presumption.' 9 ' The court of appeals upheld, therefore, the trial court's decision
ordering a new trial in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety in the earlier
trial. 92
In a second case seeking post trial relief, Rodriquez v. Conant, the New Mexico
Supreme Court considered the delicate balance between finality of judgment and
the court's traditional reluctance to grant default judgments.' Plaintiff Conant
had instituted a defamation action against her employer, as a result of plaintiff's
alleged "failure" of a polygraph examination administered to certain employees
suspected of theft. "9 Plaintiff subsequently amended her complaint to add defendant Rodriquez, who owned and operated the polygraph administering business, and the employee who conducted the polygraph examination. "' Plaintiff's
employment was subsequently terminated, allegedly as a result of the results of
the polygraph examination.'96
Defendant Rodriquez was served with the amended complaint but neither
answered the complaint nor filed an appearance.' 97 The trial court entered a
default judgment against defendant on the issue of liability, and, after a hearing
on damages at which defendant Rodriquez did not appear, and about which
defendant Rodriquez did not receive notice, entered a final judgment for plaintiff
for all damages requested plus costs.' 98 Defendant Rodriquez moved to set aside
the default judgment, which motion was granted by the trial court without a
hearing. ' The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order setting aside the
default judgment, on the grounds that the record disclosed no grounds supporting
the trial court's discretion to set aside the default judgment. 2'
The supreme court reversed. 20 ' The court disagreed with the court of appeals'
statement that the only ground advanced by defendant to set aside the judgment
was excusable neglect under New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-060(b)( 1).22
It thus found no need to review the court of appeals' determination that failure
to recall being served--constituting mere carelessness or forgetfulness-was
189. Id. at 790, 727 P.2d at 555.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 105 N.M. 746, 737 P.2d 527 (1987).
194. Id. at 747, 737 P.2d at 528.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 747-49, 737 P.2d at 528-30.
198. Id. at 748, 737 P.2d at 529.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 750, 737 P.2d at 531.
202. Under Rule 1-060(b)(I), ajudgment may be set aside for reasons of mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.
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insufficient justification for setting aside the judgment under that Rule." °3 Instead,
the supreme court found that the trial court's action could be sustained under
Rule 1-060(b)(6)."se The court emphasized Rule 1-060(b)(6)'s requirement of a
showing of exceptional circumstances and reasons for relief other than those set
out in Rules 1-060(b)(l) through (5).20° The supreme court found that a combination of two circumstances fulfilled that requirement: first, that plaintiff failed
to provide notice to defendant despite her communications with defendant during
the pendency of her lawsuit,' and, second, the fact that the default judgment
awarded $55,000.00 in damages, while plaintiff had settled her claims against
her employer for only $1,900.00. 2' Furthermore, although the court explicitly
refused to reach the merits of defendant's defenses,"m the court stated that "they
demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense." 2' Therefore, because defendant demonstrated both a meritorious defense and grounds for relief under
Rule 1-060(b)(6), the supreme court held that the district court had not abused
its discretion by setting aside the default judgments.2"'
B. Appeals
During the Survey year, the New Mexico Supreme Court enacted new Rules
of Appellate Procedure governing all appeals from orders or judgments entered
on or after January 1, 1987, and governing all original proceedings filed in the
supreme court on or after that date."' The Rules provide detailed requirements
pertaining to filing, 2 2 docketing statements,213 assignment of cases, 2 14 oral arguments,"' and rehearings, 216 and must be consulted by practitioners in the New
Mexico appellate courts.
203. 105 N.M. at 750, 737 P.2d at 531.
204. Rule 1-060(b)(6) provides general grounds for relief in addition to the five specific reasons set
forth in Rule I- 060(b), namely, "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
205. 105 N.M. at 750, 737 P.2d at 531.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Defendant had alleged that he had obtained two releases of liability from plaintiff before conducting
her polygraph examinations, that he was acting as the agent of plaintiff's employer, that the employee who
administered the polygraph examinations was not defendant's employee but an independent contractor, and
that plaintiff's complaint against defendant failed to state a cause of action. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 751, 737 P.2d at 532.
211. The new Rules of Appellate Procedure are codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-101 to -607 (Recomp.
1986) and areto be cited as SCRA 1986, 12-. SCRA 1986, 12-101.
212. SCRA 1986, 12-201(A) and (B) regulate the timing of filing the notice of appeal and the content
of that notice; 12-202(D) regulates service of the notice of appeal.
213. SCRA 1986, 12-208 regulates the timing of filing and content of docketing statements. Rule 12312(A) provides that failure to file a docketing statement may be grounds for dismissal of an appeal. See
also, DeTevis v. Aragon, 104 N.M. 793, 727 P.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1986), in which the appellate court held
that nonjurisdictional issues not addressed in the docketing statement could not be asserted for the first
time in the appellate brief-in-chief.
214. Under SCRA 1986, 12-210 cases are to be assigned to one of four calendars, based on the docketing
statement: the general, limited, legal and summary calendars. The different calendars have substantively
different briefing schedules and requirements.
215. Oral argument must be requested by a separate pleading and must set out the reasons why oral
argument would be helpful. SCRA 1986, 12-214(B). Oral argument may not be requested in cases assigned
to the summary calendar. SCRA 1986, 12-210(E).
216. SCRA 1986, 12-404 regulates motions for rehearing. Under Rule 12-404(C) the granting of a
motion for rehearing has the effect of suspending the decision or opinion of the court until final determination
by the appellate court.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals decided two cases bearing on procedural
prerequisites to appeals during the Survey year. In Dillardv. Dillard,2 7 the court
held that appellant's failure to make a written request of the trial court for findings
and conclusions constituted a waiver of objection to the district court's findings
and precluded appellate review of the district court order.2 8 The court specifically
reserved ruling on whether a written general request would be sufficient to
preserve a party's right to claim error in the trial court's refusal to make findings
and conclusions.21 9
In McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, Inc.,220 the court of appeals ruled that
it was within the trial court's discretion to grant a motion for extension of time
to file a notice of appeal even after a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely
had been filed with the court of appeals. 22' The court of appeals had not, however,
ruled on the motion to dismiss when the motion for extension of time was filed.222
The New Mexico Court of Appeals also ruled on three cases dealing with the
finality of judgments for purposes of appeal during the Survey year. In Hiatt v.
Kiel,223 the court of appeals ruled that a judgment improperly entered because
it was entered without notice to defense counsel was not a final judgment for
purposes of appeal. 224 The trial court subsequently granted defendant's motion
to set aside the judgment, but later reversed the grant of the motion, and reinstated
the judgment. Defendant appealed from that judgment within the statutorilyspecified period, but plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that
defendant ought to have appealed after the judgment first had been entered. The
court of appeals disagreed, and denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that
the initial judgment had not been a final judgment because it was entered im217. 104 N.M' 763, 727 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1986).
218. Id. at 765, 727 P.2d at 73. Appellant had failed to tender any requested findings and conclusions
to the trial court. Appellant also failed to include, on appeal, any record of the proceedings before the trial
court priorto the order from which she appealed. Id.
219. Id. at 766, 727 P.2d at 74.
220. 104 N.M. 523, 724 P.2d 232 (Ct. App. 1986).
221. Id. at 525, 724 P.2d at 234. The new Rules of Appellate Procedure now specify that the district
court retains jurisdiction to rule on a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal, regardless of
whether the notice of appeal has been filed. SCRA 1986, 12-201(E)(3).
222. 104 N.M. at 525, 724 P.2d at 234. Defendants had filed a timely notice of appeal from a judgment
entered on May 3, 1984. Plaintiff's cross-appeal should have been filed by June 4, 1984, under Civ. R.
App. P. 3(a)(1), now SCRA 1986, 12- 201(A). Plaintiff actually filed her cross-appeal on June 6, 1986.
Defendants filed a motion with the court of appeals to dismiss plaintiff's cross-appeal as untimely, but
before the appellate court ruled on the motion, plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to file the
notice of appeal, pursuant to Civ. R. App. P. 3(f), which is now codified at SCRA 1986, 12-201(E)(2).
The motion for extension of time had been filed more than 30 days after the entry of judgment, but less
than 60 days after judgment was entered. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion after hearing arguments
by both parties. The court of appeals was not notified that the district court had granted the motion for
extension of time, and granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's cross-appeal on June 25, 1984.
After the court of appeals learned that the motion for extension of time had been granted, it reinstated
plaintiff's cross-appeal. The court then declined to reconsider its reinstatement of the appeal. Id.
223. 25 N.M. BAR BULL. 567 (Ct. App. Apr. 29, 1986).
224. Id. at 569. Defense counsel had received notice of the judgment after judgment was entered, in
violation of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-1-2 (1978). That statute provides that when the judgment of the court
is not rendered at the time of a hearing before the judge, "no judgment or order relative to the matters
pertaining to such hearing shall be entered until notice of the same shall have been given to the attorneys
for the respective parties in the action."
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properly; only the reinstatement of the judgment was a "final judgment" from
which the defendant could appeal.225
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,226 a divorce action, the court of appeals ruled that a
letter from the trial court was not a final and appealable order. The trial had
been bifurcated and, after one issue had been tried, the trial court notified the
parties as to its rulings on the issue by letter, indicating that the husband's C.P.A.
practice would be characterized as a community asset for purposes of property
division. The court of appeals ruled that the letter lacked the statutory language
required under New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure 1-054(c) to terminate the
action,"' and that the court's ruling became final only when the final judgment
subsequently was entered in the case.228
Similarly, in Waisner v. Jones,229 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reaffirmed
its policy against piecemeal appeals when it held that an appeal from a trial court
Rule 1-060(b) order was premature. Following a jury verdict in a case for
unlawful repossession of a vehicle, the trial court granted defendant's motion
for relief under Rule 1-060(b), and ordered a sale of the vehicle by a special
master. The proceeds of the sale were to be held by the court until the court
made a final determination as to the proceeds' distribution. The court of appeals
held that this order was not a final judgment, because the distribution issue
remained to be decided by the trial court.230 The appeal was, therefore, dismissed
as premature. 23'
XI. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The New Mexico appellate courts decided three cases dealing with issues of
res judicata and collateral estoppel during the Survey year. In Protest of Plaza
del Sol Limited Partnershipv. Assessorfor the County of Bernalillo,232 the court
held that a stipulation fixing property tax values was res judicata only for the
year in question; it was not binding on any subsequent tax year. In Silva v.
State,233 the second case concerning this issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court
provided a detailed analysis of the law governing res judicata and collateral
estoppel while affirming the denial of partial summary judgment in a case arising
225. 25 N.M. BAR BULL. at 568-69.
226. 104 N.M. 205, 719 P.2d 432 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 104 N.M. 84, 717 P.2d 60 (1986).
227. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(c) provided in pertinent part as follows:
[Wlhen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may
enter a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims only upon
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such
determination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims
and the claims and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgement adjudicating all the claims.
228. 104 N.M. at 208, 719 P.2d at 435.
229. 103 N.M. 749, 713 P.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1986).
230. Id. at 751, 713 P.2d at 567.
231. Id. See also, B.L. Goldberg & Assoc., Inc. v. Uptown, Inc., 103 N.M. 277, 705 P.2d 683 (1985)
(trial court order dismissing a counterclaim held not a final, appealable order).
232. 104 N.M. 154, 717 P.2d 1123 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 104 N.M. 54, 716 P.2d 245 (1986).
233. 26 N.M. BAR BULL. 962 (Nov. 3, 1987).
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out of a prior action taken by the United States District Court of the District of
New Mexico. 2" The state court action arose out of the death of a prison inmate
who committed suicide while incarcerated.2 35 Plaintiffs had moved for summary
judgment on the issue of liability, relying on the doctrines of res judicata or,
alternatively, upon collateral estoppel. 2" Their motion relied on a federal court
order finding that the Secretary of Corrections and others connected with the
Department of Corrections had failed to operate by the
2 37 standards and procedures
required by the earlier federal court consent decree.
The supreme court found the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable, because
the ultimate facts necessary for the resolution of the two suits were different,
and the issues necessarily dispositive in the prior action were different from those
in the subsequent case.23 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, however, would
apply even though the cause of action in the second case was not identical with
that of the first case.239 Although the supreme court acknowledged that New
Mexico had adhered to the rule that collateral estoppel required the parties in
the second suit to be the same or in privity with the parties in the first suit, the
court recognized that "[a] growing number of jurisdictions hold that, absent
fundamental unfairness in a given case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel may
be applied against parties or their privies to both suits regardless of whether the
party asserting the doctrine was privy to the first suit." 2"nThe court then adopted
the rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in ParklaneHosiery Co.
v. Shore,24 and allowed a plaintiff to use the doctrine of offensive collateral
estoppel to foreclose a defendant from litigating an issue that the defendant had
234. Id. at 965. The prior case, Duran v. Anaya, No. 7-721-JB (D.N.M. June 27, 1986), is a class
action in which partial consent decrees and an agreement were approved and adopted on July 14, 1980,
requiring the State of New Mexico, its Corrections Department, and its Secretary of Corrections to operate
by certain standards, procedures and policies, for the benefit of a class of prison inmates to which Silva,
the deceased plaintiff in this case, belonged.
235. 26 N.M. BAR BULL. at 962.
236. Id.
237. id. The federal court order was based on unchallenged findings by a special master who had
conducted an evidentiary hearing into the events and circumstances surrounding plaintiff Silva's death.
Adherence to the required standards and procedures would have caused Silva to be placed on a suicide
watch and would have protected him from a suicide attempt, or, following the suicide attempt, would have
aided in his resuscitation. Id.
238. Id. at 963. The supreme court explained that "the hearing ordered by the federal court to inquire
into whether the defendants in Duran were in compliance with the 'consent decree' with respect to the
events and circumstances surrounding Silva's death was not the same cause of action as the personal
representative's action for wrongful death." Id. at 962-63.
239. Id. at 963.
240. Id. The court cited Edwards v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Clovis, 102 N.M. 396, 401, 696
P.2d 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1985) for the proposition that "defensive" use of collateral estoppel was allowed
despite the fact that the defendant had not been a party to the prior federal court action. In that action
brought by Edwards against the United States, Edwards had claimed that a tax was wrongfully levied on
First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Clovis. In Edwards' second lawsuit, First Federal relied on
the memorandum and decision in the federal suit, which actually and necessarily decided the issues presented
in the second state action. In Silva, the New Mexico Supreme Court approved the court of appeals' decision
affirming summary judgment in Edwards. 26 N.M. BAR BULL. at 963.
241. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In Parklane Hosiery, the United States Supreme Court approved a rule
allowing the use of "offensive" collateral estoppel except in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined
in the earlier action or where the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant. Id. at
330-31.
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previously litigated unsuccessfully, even if the plaintiff had not been privy to
the prior action.242 The court determined, however, that the federal court had
not actually and necessarily made a final determination that any failure of defendants to exercise ordinary care was a proximate cause of Silva's death.243
Therefore, the trial court's denial of summary judgment on the issue of liability
was proper. 2"
Finally, in Western Production CreditAssociation v. Kear,245 the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited relitigation
of an affirmative defense that was raised and litigated in an earlier lawsuit on a
debt owed by defendants to plaintiff. Ajudgment creditor had brought suit against
the defendants to set aside two conveyances of land alleged to have been made
fraudulently in an attempt to prevent collection of defendants' obligation to
plaintiff. 2' Defendants had claimed that they had been forced to sell cattle as a
means of partially satisfying their debt to plaintiff, but they had neither pled that
affirmative defense nor moved to have the pleadings amended to conform to the
evidence at trial. 47 The supreme court ruled that the evidence should have been
excluded, but that even if considered, the affirmative defense was barred by
collateral estoppel because it had been litigated in an earlier action.'"
XII. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The New Mexico appellate courts decided four cases dealing with statutes of
limitations during the Survey year; two of these cases have procedural implications, and the remaining two are more significant in their substantive application. In Dow v. Chilili CooperativeAssociation,249 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that when defending against a summary judgment motion, the party
claiming that a statute of limitations should be tolled has the burden of alleging
sufficient facts that, if proved, would toll the statute. In an action for injunctive
relief for interference with use and enjoyment of land, plaintiff had successfully
moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that defendant's counterclaim
was barred by the statute of limitations contained in Section 37-1-4 of the New
Mexico Statutes. Defendant conceded that the four-year statute of limitations
applied, but urged the application of a second statute, tolling the limitations
period.'O Defendant failed to substantiate its argument with admissible evidence,
and therefore failed to carry its burden in opposing the motion for summary
judgment."'
242.
243.
244.
245.

26 N.M. BAR BULL. at 964.
Id.
Id. at 965.
104 N.M. 494. 723 P.2d 965 (1986).

246. Id.
247. Id. at 495, 723 P.2d at 966.
248. Id.
249. 105 N.M. 52, 728 P.2d 462 (1986).
250. The second statute of limitations provided that in an action for injuries to property on the ground
of fraud, the cause of action would not accrue until the fraud was discovered. N.M. STAT. ANN. §37-17 (1978).
251. 105 N.M. at 54, 728 P.2d at 464.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

In Estate of Gutierrez v. Albuquerque Police Department,252 the court of appeals
determined that the two-year statute of limitations contained in Section 41-4-15
of the New Mexico Statutes was not tolled while the case was pending in federal
court. This wrongful death action had originally been filed in federal district
court under federal civil rights statutes, with a pendent state law claim against
the Albuquerque Police Department and the Bernalillo County Detention Center.253 Plaintiff's state law claim subsequently was dismissed, and plaintiff refiled
that claim in state court, after the two-year period specified in the New Mexico
Tort Claims Act's statute of limitations had passed.' The court of appeals
acknowledged the dilemma faced by plaintiffs seeking to litigate their federal
civil rights claims and state law claims in the same forum, in the face of "a
'
Nevertheless, the court held that
rapidly shifting set of federal precedents." 255
the plaintiff's case was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable
tolling would not apply, because plaintiff had had his day in court.256 The court
also held that the savings provision codified at Section 37-1-14 was inapplicable
in the face of the specific statute of limitations contained in Section 41-4-15."
Finally, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Delgadillo v. City of Socorro" 8
held that a gas line replacement and relocation was a "physical improvement to
real property," thus rendering the ten-year statute of limitations contained in
Section 37-1-27 (1978) applicable to bar third-party plaintiff's action. 9 In Long
v. Weaver, 26 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the limitations period
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act begins when the injury manifests itself
in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable, rather than when the
wrongful or negligent act occurs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
finding that a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment existed, because a factual question existed as to when the plaintiff's injury manifested itself and was ascertainable. 26'

252. 104 N.M. I I, 717 P.2d 87 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986).
253. Id. at 112, 717 P.2d at 88.
254. td.
255. id. at 116, 717 P.2d at 92 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) and Wojciechowski v. Harriman, 607 F. Supp. 631 (D.N.M. 1985)).
256. 104 N.M. at 116, 717 P.2d at 92. Plaintiff had had a hearing on the merits of his federal claims
against the same defendants in federal district court and had appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Therefore, "[tihere is no 'technical forfeiture,' no denial of plaintiff's day in court." Id.
257. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-14 (1978) provides: "'if,after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff
fails therein for any cause, except negligence in its prosecution, and a new suit be commenced within six
months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the purposes herein contemplated, be deemed a continuation
of the first." The court also noted that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-17 (1978) provided that the earlier section
would not apply when another statute of limitations limited the action. 104 N.M. at 114, 717 P.2d at 90.
258. 104 N.M. 476, 723 P.2d 245 (1986).
259. Id. at 479, 723 P.2d at 248.
260. 105 N.M. 188, 730 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1986).
261. Id. at 192, 730 P.2d at 495.

